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THE SEGREGATION DECISIONS AND THE
RESULTING PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
By JESS JOSEPH AGuiLAR and ROBERT PETER AGUILAR
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of State and
local governments... It is the very foundation of good citizenship... In
these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to suc-
ceed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an oppor-
tunity, where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms."'
Thus the Negro student was given the right to attend public schools
without discrimination because of race.
Educational Status of Southern Negro Prior to
Brown Decision
In the South, prior to the Civil War, there existed few common schools
supported by general taxation.2
"Education of Negroes was extremely limited and practically all of the
race was illiterate. In fact the education of Negroes was forbidden by law
in some states."
'3
The Civil War shattered the promising beginnings of free schools in the
South. After the catastrophe of war the efforts to develop public school
systems began anew, with impoverished resources and the great burden of
a bi-racial system.
The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not find its way into the courts
until 1896 with the case of Plessy v. Ferguson.4 The court stated in its
opinion that a "statute which implies merely a legal distinction between
White and colored races... has no tendency to destroy the legal equality
of the two races."' In effect the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not designed to achieve social and legal equality for the Negro, and
that segregation was permissible if facilities were equal. However, the
Plessy case involved transportation and did not deal directly with segre-
gation in education. The reference to it was purely by way of dicta.
"The most common instance of this [segregation] is connected with the
establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has
been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 The only southern states that made noticeable progress in founding free public schools
prior to the Civil War were Kentucky and North Carolina. See EATON, A HISTORY OF THE 0l
SOUTH 476 (1949).
3 De Lacy, George L., The Segregation Cases: A Judicial Problem. Judicially Solved, 43
A.B.A. JouR. 518 (June, 1957).
S163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3 Id. at 543.
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states where the political rights of colored races have been longest and most
earnestly enforced." 6
By analogy the courts subsequently applied the Plessy decision to the
field of education. Where such an analogy was not made some form of relief
was granted to the Negroes on other bases, thus avoiding the issue of the
constitutionality of the doctrine. The proposition was never actually tested
in the Supreme Court of the United States until Brown v. Bd. of Education7
was litigated in 1954 since the doctrine had never been directly put in issue.
In the first United States Supreme Court case involving segregation in
education, Cummings v. Bd. of Education,' petitioners sought to enjoin the
Board from using public funds for support of an all-White high school
where the portion of the funds allocated for Negroes was spent only on an
elementary school. The court denied the injunction and evaded considera-
tion of the segregation question saying: ". . . we need not consider that
question in this case. No such issue was made in the pleadings. ..'
In 1903 the validity of a Kentucky school segregation statute was re-
viewed in Berea College v. Kentucky.1" The statute- prohibited any per-
son or corporation from operating an educational institution where both
White and Negro students were in attendance. Berea College being a cor-
porate entity, the court, in upholding the statute, again found a means of
evading the question of segregation. The validity of the statute was tested
only as it applied to a corporation. The court held that since Kentucky had
reserved the power to alter, amend, or repeal the corporate charter there
was no denial of due process or other violation of the Federal Constitution.
While the United States Supreme Court was evading the segregation
issue, the state courts and federal courts were building up a series of de-
cisions in support of segregation in the schools.' 2
But in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,3 the University of Missouri
refused to admit a Negro to its Law School, solely on the basis of his color.
Since the state's Negro university did not offer a law course the Board
offered to send the Negro plaintiff out of state and to pay his tuition fees.
This position was upheld by the state courts. In overruling the state court,
the United States Supreme Court declared that whatever opportunities
6Id. at 544.
7 Supra note 1.
8 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
9 Id. at 543.
10 211 U.S. 45 (1903).
1 AcTs o KEuNTVc , c. 85 (1905).
12 Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 F. 381 (N.D. Calif. 1902); U.S. v. Buntin, 10 F. 730 (S.D
Ohio 1882) ; Bertonneau v. Bd. of Directors of City Schools, Fed. Cas. No. 1,361 (3 Woods 177)
(1878) ; Harrison v. Riddle, 44 Ariz. 331, 36 P.2d 984 (1934) ; Greathouse v. Bd. of School
Comr's of City of Indianapolis, 198 Ind. 95, 151 N.E. 411 (1929) ; State v. Board of Directors of
School Dist., 154 Ark. 176, 242 S.W. 545 (1922) ; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874) ; Dallas v.
Fosdick, 40 How. Prac. 249 (N.Y. 1869) ; Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. (2 Cart.) 332 (1850) ; Rob-
erts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
3305 U.S. 337 (1938). Accord, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v.
Olahon a State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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were offered to Whites must be made available to Negroes. Since the Negro
university had no law school the state school must be open to Negroes. The
court did not determine whether a separate law school for Negroes would
satisfy the Federal Constitution.
The Gaines case opened the way to desegregation on the graduate
school level. The Brown decision seemed but a logical subsequent step.
Era of the Brown Decision
Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren, speaking for the court in the Brown
decision, emphatically declared: "In the field of public education the doc-
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal."' 4 The court reasoned that to allow states to seg-
regate in the field of education would deprive the Negro of the equal pro-
tection of the laws as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
legal effect of the Brown decision was that in the field of education the
Fourteenth Amendment acts to impose a duty upon the state not to dis-
criminate because of a person's race or color. Thus, the far-reaching doc-
trine espoused under the Plessy case became null and void as applied to the
field of public education.
It cannot be asserted that the Negro's rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment are positive ones. It does not call for a sanction against a
state's failure, either advertently or inadvertently, to act affirmatively."
There seems to be no positive duty imposed upon a state to provide its citi-
zens with public education, nor is there a duty to provide the Negro with
education in an integrated school.' 6 The only duty upon the state is not to
discriminate if it provides public education.
At the time of the Brown decision at least 18 states had statutes requir-
ing segregation in their public schools.' It is obvious that these statutes, by
force of the Brown decision, became invalid upon their face.
A major problem in enforcement of the Supreme Court's decree was
that of time-by what date must the states abolish segregation in public
schools? Another problem was that of ascertaining what, in fact, is dis-
14 See note 1 supra at 495.
15 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
16 Thompson v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 144 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Va. 1956).
17 ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 52, § 93 (1940); ARz. CODE ANN.
§ 54-416 (1939); ARK. STATE ANN. §§ 80-509 (1941); DEL. REV. CODE § 2631 (1935); FLA.
CONST. art. XII, § 12, FLA. STAT. § 228.09 (1941); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 2-6601 (Park, 1933), as amended Ga. Laws (1945), p. 137; Ky. CoNsT. § 187, Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 158.020 (Cullen, 1944); LA. CON T. art. XII, § 1, MD. ANN. CODE, Gen. Laws, art. 77, § III
(Flack, 1939) ; MIss. CONST. art. VIII § 207, Miss. CODE ANN. § 6276 (1942); Mo. CoNsT.
art. XI § 3, Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10349 (1939); N.C. CONST. art. IX § 2, N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 115-2, 115-30, 115-60, 115-97 (Mechie, 1943); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CoNsT.
art. XI, § 7, S.C. CODE ANN. § 5377 (1942); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2377, 2393.9, 11395 (Mechie,
1938) ; TEx. CoNST. art. VII, § 7, TEX. REv. STAT. art. 2900 (Vernon, 1936) ; VA. CONST. art.
IX, § 140, VA. CODE ArN. § 22-221 (1950); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 8, W. VA. CODE § 1775
(1949).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
crimination within the field of education. This latter problem will be more
fully discussed below.
The Supreme Court declared in the second Brown decision"' that public
officials must make "a prompt and reasonable start toward full compli-
ance" with the desegregation ruling. The court also said that a proper test
for courts to consider in the pacific settlement of these problems would be
the good faith implementation of desegregation by the states. The court
meant, here, that before a state official could be held in contempt for failure
to comply with the desegregation ruling in the first Brown decision it would
be necessary to consider his good faith efforts toward implementation of the
new doctrine. Time, then, became another factor to consider within the
meaning of the term "good faith."
Inevitably any Supreme Court case of first impression which so greatly
affects the social, psychological and educational well-being of such great
masses of people must necessarily require the court to consider the momen-
tous problem of an effective means of enforcement. Basically, the problem
is centered around historical tradition rather than factual reasoning. Con-
stitutional rights are being pitted against a deep-rooted feeling of White
supremacy and states' rights.
As pointed out earlier the "separate but equal" doctrine entered our
law through mere incorporation and became so imbedded as a general rule
that the courts tried every way possible to avoid discussion of the prob-
lem. 9 With the courts in many parts of the country supporting segregation
in the public schools, as well as in other facets of public facilities, the tradi-
tion became a pattern, a mode of living, so to speak.
Any change in living conditions oftentimes brings about a public bar-
rage of protest. Immediate comments by public officials in the South indi-
cated that it would take more than a Supreme Court decision to change
what they considered "existing legal principles." The governor of Virginia
in addressing the General Assembly at a Special Session on August 2, 1956,
said:
"'We have an excellent system of public schools. . . for both White and
Negro pupils. We have invested many millions... in it and have vastly
increased appropriations... for its maintenance and operation ... because
we realize the importance of education to all our citizens. We want to pre-
serve this system and the opportunities it offers, without discrimination to
members of all races. We are convinced that it can be preserved and oper-
ated as an efficient state-wide system only by segregation of the races. We
likewise are satisfied that we are within our rights, historically and legally,
in taking every honorable and constitutional step to retain control and
jurisdiction over this cherished system of public education. Our position
was confirmed and encouraged by every decision of the Supreme Court
18 Brown v. Bd. of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Since the first Brown decision did not
allow for implementation of desegregation a second decree was necessary.
19 See notes 10, 13 supra.
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of the United States over a period of nearly sixty years prior to 1954.'"
[Emphasis added.] 20
As a contemporary backdrop to the aftermath of the opinion of the
second Brown decision2' we have the recent riots and pupil-harassing in
Arkansas on the opening day of school. This problem will be more fully
discussed below.
Associated Press and United Press news releases on September 3, 1957,
the first day of school in the South, pointed out that integration in high
schools in both Kentucky and Tennessee met with violence of a lesser de-
gree than that in Arkansas. The news services also reported that North
Carolina appeared to be free of any major violence although Greensboro,
North Carolina, elementary and junior high schools were surrounded by
noisy, jeering crowds.
The scope of this comment shall be limited to a discussion of the means
already employed or those contemplated by state officials or pressure
groups to evade the legal effect of the segregation cases.
Attempted Evasion Through Legislation
Since the segregation cases became the established law with regard to
education various means have been employed to either limit or completely
nullify their legal effect. Legislation coupled with an announced state policy
of continued segregation has been the most obvious and daring.
In Adkins v. School Board of the City of Newport News, it was held
that the Virginia Pupil Placement Act was unconstitutional on its face
because it was discriminatory in nature and hence in outright violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court in the first Brown decision.
The Pupil Placement Act authorized the Virginia school boards to take
into consideration, in the placement of pupils, such factors as availability
of facilities, health, aptitude of the child and the availability of transporta-
tion. The Act further provided that children who had heretofore attended
a particular public school would not be reassigned to a different one except
for good cause shown. This latter provision would have the effect of per-
petuating segregation which existed openly prior to the Act.
Virginia defended the Act on the ground that Negroes were not being
discriminated against as a class. District Judge Hoffman, speaking for the
court, declared:
"Courts cannot be blind to the obvious, and the mere fact that Chapter 70
[Pupil Placement Act] makes no mention of white or colored children is
immaterial when we consider the clear intent of the legislative body."' m
2 0 Adkins v. School Bd. of City of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D. Va. 1957).
2 1 Supra note 18.
22Supra note 20.
2 3 Id. at 442, cert. denied, 18 C.C.H. S. Ct. Bull, No. 3 (Oct. 21, 1957).
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At page 446 of the opinion the court further emphasized:
"The pattern is plain-the Legislature has adopted procedures to defeat
the Brown decision. In doing so it is safe to say that Chapter 70 is invalid
on its face."
This case points out the proposition that if a legislative enactment in-
volving education is shown to be a mere subterfuge or cloudy method of
avoiding and side-stepping the Brown decisions it may be held invalid upon
its face.
We find, then, that the federal courts in testing the validity of these
statutes, enacted subsequent to the Brown decisions and allegedly in com-
pliance therewith, will look into legislative policy behind the enactments.
Courts will also examine the practical results as well as possible unconsti-
tutional developments even before the act is put into operation. This is
made clear in the Adkins case where the court declared the legislation in-
valid before the parties plaintiff exhausted the available administrative
remedies on the ground that no adequate remedy was, in fact, provided for
aggrieved parties.
Exercise of Police Power to Avoid Integration
In 1954, following the Brown decision, Louisiana enacted a statute
which provided that the parish superintendent annually assign each pupil
to particular schools pursuant to standards established by an existing stat-
ute calling for segregated schools. The Legislature emphasized that the
enactment was made in the exercise of the state police power to promote
and protect health, morals, better education and the peace and good order
in the state, and not because of race. The Legislature was given the neces-
sary implementing power to enact laws necessary to enforce the state police
power in this regard.
In Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush et al,24 the above case, the Fed-
eral Court held that the state constitutional provisions with regard to main-
taining segregated schools and the implementing statute were void. The
court declared:
"The use of the term police power works no magic in itself.- Undeniably
the States retain an extremely broad police power. This power, however,
as everyone knows, is itself limited by the protective shield of the Federal
Constitution.
25
The validity of the Louisiana Pupil Assignment Law was also consid-
ered by the court. In this regard, the court held that the Assignment Law
was invalid as "a further effort to stave off the effect of the Supreme Court's
school decisions." The court felt that this was "sufficient of itself to con-
demn it as part of the illegal legislative plan" comprehended by the Legis-
lature.
2 242 F2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
25 Id. at 163.
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The court further concluded that an arbitrary classification of students
to schools by race because of more frequent identification of undesirable
qualities with one race more than another is an unreasonable classification.
This classification was invalid because it denied equal protection of the
laws.
As a parallel to this situation, we have the recent incident in Little
Rock, Arkansas, which has stirred up international notoriety. Governor
Faubus' order to call out the state guard to quell disorders and prevent
wholesale breaches of the public peace had the practical effect of momen-
tarily preventing compliance with the Supreme Court's order of desegrega-
tion. Negro children were prevented at gun point from entering a previously
all-white school despite a federal court order to the contrary.
The Governor backed his action by asserting his authority under the
wide principle of a state's police power. It is easy to speculate that a head
of a state who desires to forestall the advance of integration could easily
employ the troops at his disposal to place a cordon around public schools
and thereby close them off to all Negro children under the pretext of a
necessary and proper exercise of a state's powers of police. This can be
achieved more easily in areas where some form of public spectacle has been
displayed over the integration of pupils.
The courts must closely scrutinize the fact situation prompting a state
official to use armed forces to encircle public schools on alleged grounds of
a threat of breaches of the peace.
A federal court said, regarding such situations:
"However undesirable it may be for courts to invoke federal power to stay
action under state authority, it was precisely to require such interposition
that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted by the people of the United
States. Its adoption implies that there are matters of fundamental justice
that the citizens of the United States consider so essentially an ingredient
of human rights as to require a restraint on action on behalf of any state
that appears to ignore them."1
26
As will be shown below this misuse of state power cannot persist for too
long a period where individual rights are concerned. The public interest
would require the President to invoke his authority as a last resort.
Delays Caused by Administrative Provisions
The Southern states, in setting up the machinery to effect desegregation,
have provided for administrative remedies for aggrieved parties as required
by law. In some cases, however, these administrative remedies are but an-
other means of denying Negro children enrollment in schools of their choice.
For example, the administrative remedy provided by the Virginia Pupil
2 6 d. at 166.
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Placement Act r could have consumed 105 days until final decision by the
Governor. The court indicated:
"A child seeking relief from the original designation of enrollment at the
commencement of a school term in September could not, with any degree of
confidence, anticipate a decision through administrative channels until the
middle of December.
'28
Under Section 9 of the Act, the findings of fact of the Pupil Placement
Board29 are considered final. This determination would have the effect of
depriving an aggrieved party of a federal court hearing on the facts. The
United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia, reviewing
this Act, ruled that the administrative remedy provided was inadequate.30
The Board of Education in Tennessee in similar compliance with the
Brown ruling, provided a systematic plan of gradual integration. This pro-
gram of transition to desegregation provided that for the first year quali-
fied Negro students would be admitted to the previously White colleges at
the graduate level only. In each succeeding year those qualified would be
admitted to the next lowest class. The application of the plan would deny
some Negroes the right to go to the state colleges of their choice for five
years. This plan was declared not in accordance with the Supreme Court
order requiring deliberate speed in a recent decision from the Sixth Circuit.3
In answer to the Board's defense of inadequate physical facilities, the
majority of the court stated that the Board was authorized to limit the
number of admissions but could not base such limitations upon race or
color. They said: "This is a clear discrimination between the races."3
Judicial Delays
In the second Brown decision3" Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
the court, declared: "During this period of transition, the courts will retain
jurisdiction of these cases."34 This mandate gave the federal courts full
control in determining when a school board had made a "prompt and
reasonable start" toward compliance with the first Brown decision. The
recent case of Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School District35 in-
volved the question of a federal district court's exercise of discretion in
such determination. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals decided
that the lower court had not abused its discretion when it declined to enter
a decree declaring the rights of the litigants. However, the lower court was
held in error for declaring the case moot and dismissing the action on that
basis.
27 Acrs VA. 1956, Ex. SEss., c. 70, §§ 1, 2, 2a, 3 (1-8), 4-11; see note 20 supra.
28Supra note 20 at 443.29 Three member board appointed by the Governor.
30 Supra note 20.
3 1 Booker v. State Ed. of Ed., 240 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1957).
3 2 Id. at 693.
33 Supra note 18.
34Id. at 301.
35 241 F.2d 230 (Sth Cir. 1957).
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This judicial action by the lower court had the effect of preventing the
parties plaintiff from reopening the controversy later on the issue of "a
prompt and reasonable start toward desegregation." This may be a judicial
method of temporarily obstructing integration.
Such action could be of a temporary nature only, as the Avery3" case
indicates. But, on the other hand, it may develop into a more serious prob-
lem. The Court of Appeals ordered that: "The district court should retain
jurisdiction for the entry of all judgments and orders necessary to ascer-
tain or else to require 'good faith compliance'."IST
Brown v. Rippy,38 a case from the Fifth Circuit, was an appeal from a
decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The
Court of Appeals found that an adverse judgment against Negro pupils
was entered by the lower court under a complete misapprehension of both
law and facts. In an action to require officials to desegregate public schools,
the District Court judge declined to hear the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs under the mistaken belief that the children had agreed to facts
pleaded by the school officials. The record showed the exact opposite. The
suit was determined to have been prematurely brought and was ordered
dismissed without prejudice.
To assure a proper hearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
and remanded the cause to the lower court with directions to afford the
parties a full hearing on the issues tendered in the pleadings.
Once again the United States Courts of Appeal did not allow the over-
stepping of judicial discretion to hamper the move toward public school
integration.
Apparent Compliances
It may be anticipated that in some states school districts will undertake
only surface compliance with the desegregation ruling. While asserting con-
formity, they will at the same time try to keep desegregation to a minimum.
Of the various devices looking to this end, gerrymandering of attend-
ance district is the most obvious. In most American cities, and particularly
in the South, there is an unofficial residential separation of the races. It has
been declared that:
"By establishing schools in each of these sections and tailoring the attend-
ance districts to fit the separate residential areas, local authorities may be
able to retain substantial segregation in some communities without for-
mally disobeying desegregation requirements.
39
However, where such gerrymandered districts are set up and designed
to embrace practically the entire colored population of a city, the plan may
be judicially considered a subterfuge to segregate Negro children.40 When
86 Ibid.
3
7 Id. at 235.
88 233 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1956).
89 LeFlar and Davis, Segregation in Public Schools, 67 HAv. L. REv. 377, 410 (1953).
40 Clemnmons v. Board of Ed. of Hillsboro, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
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new school districts were created by meandering up streets and alleys so
that all the Negro children would be within one district, the scheme was
struck down as unconstitutional.41
The main issue before the courts in these instances will be one of fact-
whether the districting is determined by geographic criteria or whether it
is based primarily on race without regard to geographical considerations.
In most large cities, however, it will be next to impossible to contrive ter-
ritorial attendance districts which will entirely avoid the inclusion of stu-
dents of different races.42 In the rural areas, where Negroes often live and
work on farms owned by people of other races, it will be even more dif-
ficult.48
The excuse of crowded schools is another means used to minimize inte-
gration. The Tennessee plan, discussed above, attributed the long delay to
limited physical facilities. The United States Court of Appeals, in examin-
ing the program, held it did not comply with the requirement of deliberate
speed in the integrating process.
In Clemmons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro45 a zoning resolution,
adopted on the pretext that the White schools were crowded, was held to be
a subterfuge in order to continue segregation. The court, in answering the
Board's contention, stated: "The excuse of crowding to justify segregation
has no basis in law, nor, in this case, in fact."4
Thus, we see that courts have looked with disfavor upon any plan which
continues segregation under the pretext of crowded facilities. Where the
schools are in fact crowded some proportionate means of enrollment would
best fulfill the requirements of the law.
Plain Non-Compliance and Incomplete Compliance
Before turning to legislation as a method of avoiding desegregation,
school boards in Virginia had their round with the courts. 7 Several Negro
children had attempted to enjoin the enforcement of segregation by school
boards and division superintendents of schools.
The court determined that due to the announced policy of the respec-
tive school boards, the children's individual application would have been
futile; therefore, an individual application would not be required as a con-
dition for injunctive relief.
The school boards of Virginia felt that any attempt to enjoin them
would be void as a suit against a state without its consent. The court flatly
denied such a claim and found that it could enjoin the exercise of discretion
41 Webb v. School Dist. No. 90, 167 Kan. 395, 206 P.2d 1066 (1949).
42 Supra note 39.
4 3 Ibid.
4 4 Supra note 31.
4 5 Supra note 40.
46Id. at 857.
47 School Bd. of Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F.2d S9 (4th Cir. 1956).
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by a state officer, under authority of his office, where such action would
result in a violation of another's constitutional rights. 8
The United States Court of Appeals in School Bd. v. Allen, declared:
"A state can act only through agents, and whether the agent be an individ-
ual officer or a corporate agency, it ceases to represent the state when it
attempts to use state power in violation of the Constitution and may be
enjoined from such unconstitutional action." 49
In this case we had an attempt by the school boards to continue to
enforce segregation in the public ,schools in contravention of the Brown
decision. The boards tried to justify their action upon the false premise
that they were not amenable to suit under the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment. Such outright defiance was not condoned and the injunction
against the school officials was upheld.
A similar situation arose in the city of Dayton, Delaware, where Ne-
groes brought a class suit against the State Board of Education and the
local school board because of the latter's refusal to reorganize the public
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.'
The court deciding this particular case held that the second Brown de-
cision must be read as establishing a standard for determining what consti-
tutes a good faith implementation of the governing constitutional princi-
ples set forth in the first Brown case. The court further declared that the
school authorities' so-called "good faith compliance" with the ruling against
discrimination, did not fulfill the constitutional right of nondiscrimination
in education. The trustees were found to have the burden of justifying their
delay in integration by showing that such time was necessary in the public
interest and was consistent with a good faith compliance.
Under the authority of the above case" federal courts can determine
when an asserted good faith compliance with the Brown decisions is in fact
incomplete or is no compliance at all.
Abolition of Public Schools
Immediately following the first Brown decision shouts of defiance and
threats of evading the announced doctrine were heard throughout the
southern United States. Several heads of state in the South remarked that
they would sooner close their public schools than conform to the Supreme
Court's mandate. As yet, no state has taken so drastic a step as to com-
pletely abolish public education.
Perhaps one reason for the failure of such a move might be found in
the fact that no state is yet willing to completely leave its Negro popula-
tion without any formal education. The old adage that "Ignorance breeds
48 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
49 Supra note 47 at 63.
50 Evans v. State Bd. of Ed., 145 F. Supp. 873 (D. Del. 1956).
51 Ibid.
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contempt" may well create an even greater problem for the South than that
which so squarely faces them.
It would seem foolhardy as well as financially impossible for private
organizations to undertake the task now handled by our states in the field
of public education. Without question the states would have to subsidize
the private organizations to some degree. Such a move would give rise to
questions of state action. In order for a private school system to operate
successfully without any state aid, and in order to avoid questions of state
action, some tuition would have to be required. This would leave many
white children without any education whatever since, doubtless, not all
could meet the tuition fees.
Approaching the problem from a legal point of view it may be argued
that the individual states have declined to follow through with their threats
of turning over a present state function to private enterprise because such
a move might be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, if faced
with the problem could, by analogy, apply existing authority.
The 1944 case of Smith v. Allwright5" may be applicable in such a situ-
ation. The Supreme Court held that primary elections operated by a politi-
cal party under the sanction and even direction of state law involved rep-
rehensible state action. The effect of these primaries was the exclusion of
Negro voters in an election involving candidates for a federal office. This
exclusion clearly violated the Fifteenth Amendment.
53
In an effort to evade the doctrine of the Allwright case, South Carolina
repealed all of its statutes which concerned party primaries. The South
Carolina Democratic Party then took over the primaries under the guise
of a private political organization and excluded Negroes therefrom. The
courts refused to accept such a subterfuge and in Rice v. Elmore54 it was
held that party officials, while participating in what amounts to a state's
election machinery, are in fact performing a state function. In holding these
primaries to be a state function, the Circuit Court of Appeals declared that
the power of the state could no longer be used in this manner since it was
in violation of the Constitution.
The states would act unwisely in deciding to turn over their public
schools to private enterprise. It is reasonable to presume that the quality
of instruction would decrease since private bodies would be unable to
handle the tremendous number of children presently attending public
schools. As a result the calibre of its citizenry would degenerate. Inevitably
state aid would be given in some form, and by applying the above analogy
a court may be led to find that a private body performing a public function
with the use of public funds and practicing racial discrimination is invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
52321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruing Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
53 U.S. CoNsT., Amend. XV, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude."
54 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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Public Pressures
The tradition of segregation may be a musty relic from the past in the
Northern states and Southern border states, which yielded without great
pain. However, in the Middle and Deep South, the old customs and ways of
life still run deep. With the opening of schools this fall came outraged re-
sistance from the public. The most belligerent troublemakers subjected
school officials to abuse by phone and mail. They threw burning bags and
paper on the house of William H. Oliver, school superintendent of Nash-
ville. Many petitions were circulated and court orders sought to block
integration.55
Oliver summed up the situation as follows:
"It is regrettable to have to do a thing the great majority of people don't
want, but since the Federal court ordered it to be done, we will try to com-
ply with the court's order in good faith." 56
At Little Rock, Arkansas, Charlotte and Greensboro, North Carolina,
school officials found themselves swamped by letters and phone calls. Many
officials were even turned on by old friends."
Public pressures of this type, unless organized, are only temporary in
nature. With reasonable patience and a firm approach they should be over-
come in a short time. Pressures from organizations such as the Ku Klux
Klan are of a more serious nature.
In such cases school boards, which are in good faith complying with
the integration ruling, may seek injunctive relief. 8 Jurisdiction of federal
courts to issue an injunction to protect federal substantive rights is well
established.59
In the Brewer case,6" a school district in Arkansas sought an injunc-
tion against further interference with the operation of desegregated schools.
Numerous acts of trespass upon school property and acts of annoying,
threatening, and intimidating the plaintiffs, were alleged. Inflammatory
speeches were made at mass meetings condoning physical violence and call-
ing for mass action in resistance to desegregation. Attempts were made by
fear and persuasion to deter the children from attending schools of that
district.
The court, in enjoining further acts by the conspiracy, said:
"Plaintiffs [School District] are under a duty to obey the constitution ...
It follows that they have a federal right to be free from direct and delib-
erate interference with the performance of the Constitutionally imposed
duty."
55 Newsweek, Vol. I, No. 11, p.35 (Sept. 9, 1957).
56 Id. at 35.
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When public pressures and demonstrations reach such proportions that
they can no longer be controlled by local or state officials the President may
use federal troops to enforce the law, as the recent Little Rock incident
showed.
Section 332 of the U.S. Code 2 provides that:
"Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combina-
tions or assemblages, for rebellion against the authority of the U. S. make
it impracticable to enforce the laws of the U. S. in any State... by the ordi-
nary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such
of the militia of any State and use such of the armed forces as he considers
necessary to enforce those laws or suppress the rebellion."
The President's action indicated that this power may be exercised without
a request from state authorities.
Conclusion
It is submitted that effective enforcement of the Brown decisions, will
allow the Negro to obtain an education without discrimination because
of his race in either the public schools or by extension and analogy, in pri-
vate schools where public schools are abolished.
Only time will tell whether the attitudes of Southern officials as well as
Southern people, as previously shown, indicate a concrete bloc to the Su-
preme Court's mandate.
It seems a sensible conclusion that the matter will resolve itself within
reasonable time. Most people are basically law abiding, and although they
may offer bitter resistance to this new doctrine, they will eventually see the
fairness in integration.
The words of President Eisenhower in a recent address63 to the nation
have indicated this:
"The overwhelming majority of our people in every section of the coun-
try are united in their respect for observation of the law... A foundation
of our American way of life is our national respect for law."
At the end of the 1955-56 school year, the South had begun desegre-
gation in 442 districts, out of a possible 3,000. By the beginning of the 1956
fall term, the total was 650. With the start of this school year, the number
is 705.16 But whether the motivating force has been court compulsion or
free choice, the important fact is that progress is being made.
By the continued exercise of tolerance and patience on the part of fed-
eral officials, one of our greatest social problems can be resolved in a ra-
tional and proper manner. A doctrine, so much a part of the way of life in
the South, should not be expected to yield to change in a relatively short
62 70A STAT. 15 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. IV, 1952). See also §§ 333, 334.6 3 President's message on sending troops to Arkansas, September 24, 1957. San Francisco
Call-Bulletin, Sept. 25, 1957, p. 9, col. 1.
64 Supra note 55.
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time. However, the rights of individuals are basic and must survive if our
form of constitutional government is to continue its existence.
Apart from the more immediate problems commented upon above there
remains the question of an individual's right to sue. The question of who
can sue and who is sueable will be discussed more extensively in a com-
panion article.65
For the present it might be noted that any pupil deprived of the equal
protection of the laws, through segregation, his parents or legal guardian
are recognized as proper parties plaintiff.66 A school board may also go into
a court of equity to seek an injunction against any interference with its
policy of integration. 7 On the other hand, a county school board or a city
superintendent of schools is sueable even though acting as agent of the
state."8 The courts have held that such suit is not a suit against the state. 9
65See 9 HASTIGS L.J ......... (1958).
66 See note 18 supra.
67 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
68 School Board of City of Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Thompson
v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 144 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Va. 1956) ; Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
69 School Board of City of Charlottesville v. Allen, note 68 supra; Orleans Parish School
Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
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